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Trends Box 
x Recent research on mind-wandering has indicated that this experience is a complex 
phenomenon varying on numerous dimensions, which suggests that mind-wandering is 
best considered as a multidimensional construct held together by patterns of overlapping 
and non-overlapping features. 
 
x To date, however, researchers have tended to treat mind-wandering as a unitary construct 
(e.g., encompassing only task-unrelated thought). 
 
x We argue that this practice leads to a lack of appreciation of the specificity of particular 
findings and that it artificially constrains conceptual and theoretical understanding of the 
phenomenon. 
 
x We therefore propose that researchers adopt a family-resemblances approach to mind-
wandering, which involves treating mind-wandering as a heterogeneous construct, and 
clearly measuring/describing the specific aspects of the variety of mind-wandering under 
investigation. 
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Abstract 
As empirical research on mind-wandering accelerates, we draw attention to an emerging trend in 
how mind-wandering is conceptualized. Previously articulated definitions of mind-wandering 
differ from each other in important ways, yet they also maintain overlapping characteristics. This 
conceptual structure suggests that mind-wandering is best considered from a family-
resemblances perspective, which entails treating it as a graded, heterogeneous construct and 
clearly measuring and describing the specific aspect(s) of mind-wandering that researchers are 
investigating. We believe that adopting this family-resemblances approach will increase 
conceptual and methodological connections among related phenomena in the mind-wandering 
family and encourage a more nuanced and precise understanding of the many varieties of mind-
wandering.  
 
Keywords: mind-wandering; family resemblances; definition; heterogeneous; varieties  
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³0LQG-ZDQGHULQJ´HQFRPSDVVHVDEURDGUDQJHRISKHQRPHQD 
Introspection indicates that our conscious experiences are not always tied to ongoing 
events or to tasks we are performing. Scientific investigation of this phenomenon, commonly 
UHIHUUHGWRDV³PLQG-ZDQGHULQJ´KDVUHFHQWO\DFFHOHUDWHG/DERUDWRU\DQGGDLO\-life studies of 
mind-wandering amply demonstrate the prevalence and importance of this aspect of human 
experience. Estimates suggest that we spend upwards of half our waking lives engaged in mind-
wandering [1]. Moreover, this ubiquitous experience predicts a range of important functions and 
outcomes. On the one hand, mind-wandering has been associated with such beneficial processes 
as goal-directed thinking [2], planning [3], and creativity [4]. On the other hand, it correlates 
with such costly outcomes as attenuated processing of the environment [5, 6], driving accidents 
[7], disruptions to learning [8-10], affective dysfunction [11], and impaired performance in daily 
life [12]$EURDGHUWKHPHWKDWKDVDOVRHPHUJHGLVWKDW³PLQG-ZDQGHULQJ´HQFRPSDVVHVDUDQJH
of experiences that vary in terms of content, intentionality, task-relatedness, and relationship to 
external stimuli (among other things). This heterogeneity suggests that, like other natural 
constructs (e.g., mindfulness [13], intelligence [14], creativity [15]), mind-wandering might be 
best considered from a family-resemblances perspective ± that is, as a heterogeneous, fuzzy-
boundaried construct that coheres amid patterns of overlapping and non-overlapping features.  
In this article, we will first examine prominent definitions of mind-wandering, 
considering the benefits of viewing them as complementary²and necessarily incomplete²
rather than competing. We will then outline a family-resemblances framework for mind-
wandering research and consider its utility. Finally, we will explain how adopting this 
framework will facilitate development of more nuanced scientific accounts of mind-wandering 
and we provide empirical strategies for achieving this goal. 
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Different Definitions of Mind-Wandering Are Best Viewed as Complementary, Not 
Competing 
To date, the most common definitions of mind-wandering include task-unrelated thought 
(TUT), unintentional thought, stimulus-independent thought (SIT), stimulus-independent and 
task-unrelated thought (SITUT), and meandering, unguided thought. Although investigations of 
these varieties of mind-wandering have been fruitful, challenges arise from such conceptual 
heterogeneity: Researchers have treated these perspectives on mind-wandering as theoretical 
competitors. Indeed, some published definitions of mind-wandering are exclusive of others (e.g., 
mind-wandering must reflect task-unrelated thought and not task-free thought [16] or mind-
wandering must reflect unguided, and not guided, thoughts, even if such thoughts are unrelated 
WRRQH¶VRQJRLQJWDVN[17]). Because each of these varieties of mind-wandering captures features 
shared by some, but not all, experiences that emerge when the mind wanders, we suggest that 
these different definitions complement, rather than compete with, one another. We ultimately 
argue that the field cannot viably assume a single definition of mind-wandering based on a 
circumscribed set of necessary and sufficient features.  
Task-Unrelated Thought  
TUT refers to thoughts that are unrelated to RQH¶V ongoing task [16]. The TUT definition 
of mind-wandering helpfully allows researchers to identify contexts requiring people to attend to 
certain tasks, as well as the consequences of attention failures. Moreover, studies examining 
TUT mimic the daily-life activities in which people engage, which helps researchers understand 
mind-ZDQGHULQJ¶V contribution to everyday pursuits [e.g., 12, 18]. A disadvantage of defining 
mind-wandering exclusively as TUT, however, is that it discounts many experiences that most 
people recognize as mind-wandering. Introspectively, we know that our minds do not stop 
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wandering when we sit idly (e.g., while riding a bus). And, empirically, mind-wandering is 
frequently studied in contexts lacking any focal task to perform; indeed, much of our knowledge 
about the neural correlates of mind-wandering comes from resting-state studies that simply 
require participants to lie in a magnetic-resonance-imaging scanner [e.g., 19]. Thus, both 
intuition and scientific research demonstrate 787¶Vinsufficiency as an exclusive definition of 
mind-wandering.  
Unintentional Thought  
Another common definition of mind-wandering is thought that occurs without intention 
[e.g., 16, 20, 21]. However, this excludes situations in which people sit dreamily, purposely 
allowing their thoughts to drift, or cases in which people deliberately neglect a task, or seek 
mental escape from unpleasant situations, in the service of entertaining TUT. Not only have 
researchers considered such scenarios to reflect mind-wandering [e.g., 22], but the assumption 
WKDWSDUWLFLSDQWV¶UHSRUWVRI³PLQG-ZDQGHULQJ´XQLIRUPO\ODFNLQWHQWLRQKDVEHHQTXestioned by 
daily-life ILQGLQJVWKDWSHRSOHRIWHQUHSRUWHQJDJLQJLQ³LQWHQWLRQDOPLQG-ZDQGHULQJ´[e.g., 23, 
24]. In the laboratory, as well, many TUTs that people report are, in fact, engaged intentionally 
[e.g., 25, 26, 27]. Thus, defining mind-wandering strictly in terms of unintentional thought seems 
too exclusive of experiences commonly recognized and self-reported as mind-wandering. 
Stimulus-Independent Thought  
SIT refers to thoughts that ³DULVHIURPLQWULQVLFFKDQJHVWKDWRFFXUZLWKLQDQLQGLYLGXDO´
DVRSSRVHGWR³VWLPXOXV-GHSHQGHQWWKRXJKWV´RU³H[WULQVLFFKDQJHVWKDWDUHFXHGGLUHFWO\IURP
perceptual events occurring in the external environment [i.e., stimulus-GHSHQGHQWWKRXJKWV@´[28, 
p. 490]. Although some researchers have proposed that mind-wandering must reflect stimulus-
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independent thought [e.g., 1]1, stimulus independence also characterizes certain forms of task-
related, goal-oriented cognition. Indeed, many tasks require information to be buffered over time 
in a stimulus-independent form. For example, while completing a working-memory task, 
participants consciously maintain information across stimulus events. Similarly, good task 
performance sometimes requires people to retrieve and generate information, as in creative-
problem-solving activities.  
Given that most researchers do not conceptualize mind-wandering as task-relevant 
cognition, and given that stimulus-independent thought can include task-relevant thought, the 
6,7GHILQLWLRQVHHPVRYHUO\LQFOXVLYHDQGWKXVFRQIOLFWVZLWKSHRSOH¶VJHQHUDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI
mind-wandering. At the same time, defining mind-wandering as SIT can be overly restrictive. 
Consider, for example, the scenario in which you are eating dinner with your family and your 
thoughts drift to an argument you just had with your sibling, who is seated next to you. Such 
stimulus-DVVRFLDWHGWKRXJKWVZRXOGTXDOLI\DV³PLQG-wandHULQJ´ to many people. Yet, because 
these thoughts were triggered by (and continue to feature) an environmental stimulus, the SIT 
definition rejects them as mind-wandering.  
Stimulus-Independent Task-Unrelated Thought 
Defining mind-wandering as SITUT [e.g., 29] circumvents the previously discussed 
problem with SIT; namely, that task performance can require people to think about stimuli no 
longer in the environment, but these goal-directed, on-task thoughts are nevertheless classified as 
                                                          
1
 Although these authors defined mind-wandering as SIT, they operationalized it for participants as TUT, without 
ensuring that reported TUTs were stimulus-LQGHSHQGHQW7KLVLQFRQVLVWHQF\EHWZHHQUHVHDUFKHUV¶FRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQV
and operationalizations of mind-wandering has also appeared in studies wherein mind-wandering was 
conceptualized/defined as unintentional TUT, but operationalized simply as ³787´DQGLQVWXGLHVwhere mind-
wandering was conceptualized/defined as internally focused thought, but again operationalized only as ³787´7KLV
is an issue to which we return, and hope to remedy, later in this article.  
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³PLQG-ZDQGHULQJ´7KLVLVQRORQJHUSUREOHPDWLFZLWKD6,787GHILQLWLRQEHFDXVHWRTXDOLI\DV
mind-wandering, thoughts must be both stimulus-independent and task-unrelated. Nonetheless, 
SITUT is limited as a gold-standard definition of mind-wandering [e.g., 30] because it excludes 
thoughts commonly recognized as mind-wandering in a similar manner as do both the SIT 
definition (e.g., mentally replaying the argument with a sibling) and TUT definition (e.g., task-
free mind-wandering on the bus). 
Meandering, Unguided Thought 
Researchers have recently proposed that, to qualify as mind-wandering, a thought must 
be meandering and unguided [e.g., 17]. Although investigations of this variety of mind-
wandering have provided theoretical insights [31], as with the other definitions, this definition 
excludes thoughts that are commonly recognized as mind-wandering (e.g., perseverative TUTs, 
or purposeful thoughts about holiday activities). We therefore cannot endorse adopting unguided 
thought as an exclusive definition of mind-wandering. 
Interim Conclusions  
Specific and exclusive definitions of mind-wandering do not²and perhaps cannot²
adequately capture the rich variety of this experience (and some definitions may incidentally 
LQFOXGHH[SHULHQFHVWKDWGRQRWVHHPWRUHIOHFW³PLQG-ZDQGHULQJ´Moreover, despite clear 
differences in conceptualizations of mind-wandering (e.g., TUT, SIT, unguided thought), 
researchers often adopt a broad-EUXVKIRFXVRQ³PLQG-ZDQGHULQJ´ZKHQGUDZLQJconclusions, 
rather than constraining theoretical discussions to the specific variety of mind-wandering 
investigated. For instance, now-common claims in the literature are that ³people spend up to 
50% of their waking lives mind-ZDQGHULQJ´DQG³PLQG-wandering predicts FUHDWLYLW\´
Importantly, however, the researchers who initially reported these findings examined only the 
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TUT variety of mind-wandering. Nevertheless, such broad claims are frequently made in 
separate studies and opinion pieces examining different varieties of mind-wandering, implying 
that these claims generalize [e.g., 32]. Researchers may thus be lumping together fundamentally 
different experiences into the same category, which could lead not only to conceptual confusion, 
but also to theoretical conflicts and inappropriate applications (for an example, see Box 1).  
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Box 1. Lumping varieties of mind-wandering together can cause theoretical complications 
McVay and Kane (2010) proposed what later became an influential theoretical account of 
mind-wandering [20]. Their Executive Control Failures × Concerns account argued that mind-
ZDQGHULQJRFFXUVZKHQDSHUVRQIDLOVWR³GHIHQGSULPDU\-task performance against interference 
IURP«WKRXJKWV´[20, p.195]. One important implication of this account, then, is that mind-
wandering reflects unintentional thoughts cued by context; indeed, deliberate, willful shifts of 
attention would hardly qualify as control failures (and might be best categorized as controlled 
processing). Thus, although the Executive Control Failures account helped guide the 
development and refinement of mind-wandering theory, it does not capture well certain varieties 
of thought that many theories anGOD\SHRSOHZRXOGFODVVLI\DV³PLQG-ZDQGHULQJ´)RUH[DPSOH
DOORZLQJRQH¶VPLQGWRZDQGHUZKLOHVLWWLQJE\WKHODNHRUGHOLEHUDWHO\SODQQLQJDGLQQHUGDWH
while sitting in calculus class, would not qualify as mind-wandering because such thoughts 
would not reflect control failures. Given that the Executive Control Failures account does not 
appertain to all varieties of mind-wandering, one may be tempted to simply reject it, particularly 
if one views mind-wandering as a unitary construct caused by a single mechanism. The family-
resemblances account of mind-wandering, in contrast, allows for the possibility that the 
Executive Control Failures account does, in fact, provide a reasonable explanation of certain 
varieties of mind-wandering only (particularly those that are unintentional and task-unrelated). 
Thus, the family-resemblances view allows room for numerous mechanisms that underpin types 
of mind-wandering. 
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Potential Solutions to Mind-:DQGHULQJ¶V&RQFHSWXDODQG'HILQLWLRQDO&KDOOHQJHV 
If no single definition of mind-wandering is universally adequate or acceptable, should 
the field simply abandon its use in favor of more nuanced, qualified terms, such as 
³unintentional task-unrelated thought,´RU³intentional stimulus-independent thought´? This 
strategy would undoubtedly increase clarity, but ³PLQG-ZDQGHULQJ´is a useful umbrella term just 
DV³FRJQLWLRQ´DQG³FUHDWLYLW\´are (and it hardly seems sensible to abandon the term 
³FRJQLWLRQ´EHFDXVHGHILQLWLRQVRIYLVXDOFRJQLWLRQGRQRWencompass those of numerical 
cognition)0RUHRYHUDGRSWLQJWKHWHUP³PLQG-ZDQGHULQJ´in 2006 [16] seems to have inspired 
an acceleration of research3HUKDSVPRVWLPSRUWDQWLQWURGXFLQJWKHWHUP³PLQG-ZDQGHULQJ´WR
the scientific literature encouraged cross-talk among researchers who were separately studying 
UHODWHGSKHQRPHQDHJ787DQGGD\GUHDPLQJ7KXVDEDQGRQLQJ³PLQG-ZDQGHULQJ´GRHVQRW
appear advisable.  
Perhaps the field should instead propose a definition of mind-wandering with necessary 
DQGVXIILFLHQWFRQGLWLRQVDVEHORQJLQJWRD³FODVVLFDOYLHZ´RIFDWHJRU\PHPEHUVKLS? Many 
researchers (ourselves included) have tried this approach. Classical definitions of mind-
wandering are appealing, but as we demonstrated above, no single definition can capture all the 
facets and subtleties of mind-wandering, and neither logic nor empiricism can select among 
them. The fact that different researchers have thoughtfully developed conflicting definitions of 
mind-wandering amply demonstrates the perils of pursuing a unitary but arbitrary conception.  
The heterogeneity of mind-wandering experiences and definitions implies that the best 
way forward may be to adopt a new approach. We propose that the field acknowledge mind-
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wandering to be a multidimensional and fuzzy construct encompassing a family of experiences 
with common and unique features2. 
A Family-Resemblances Approach to Mind-Wandering 
 ³&RQVLGHU WKHSURFHHGLQJV WKDWZHFDOOJDPHV ,PHDQERDUG-games, card-games, 
ball-games, Olympic-games, and so on. What is common to them all? ²'RQ¶WVD\
³7KHUHPXVWEHVRPHWKLQJFRPPRQRUWKH\ZRXOGQRWEHFDOOHGµJDPHV¶´²but look 
and see whether there is anything common to them all. ²For if you look at them you 
will not see something that is common to them all, but similarities, relationships, and 
DZKROHVHULHVRIWKHPDWWKDW´[Wittgenstein, 33,  pp. 31-32]. 
  As Wittgenstein noted, some categories have necessary and sufficient defining features 
that apply to all category members (e.g., prime numbers), but most human-created categories are 
KHOGWRJHWKHUE\RYHUODSSLQJVXEVHWVRIVLPLODULWLHVRU³IDPLO\UHVHPEODQFHV´UDWKHUWKDQD
common thread running through all members. Eleanor Rosch and colleagues similarly 
distinguished digital categories, for which membership is all-or-none, from natural categories, 
for which membership is analog. Natural categories are FKDUDFWHUL]HGDV³QHWZRUNVRI
RYHUODSSLQJDWWULEXWHV´[34], and exemplars of natural categories vary in terms of their ³graded 
membership´ within their categorical family: Whereas highly prototypical members have 
                                                          
2
 It might be argued that because mind-wandering has been defined in numerous different ways, it is already being 
treated as a heterogeneous construct. For example, mind-wandering has been defined across studies as unintentional 
task-unrelated thought, intentional task-unrelated thought, stimulus-dependent thought (to name a few). The 
problem, however, is that these definitions have been treated as competing classical definitions of the construct, not 
complementary definitions of a heterogeneous construct. For example, definitions requiring that thoughts must be 
unintentional in order to be considered mind-wandering compete with definitions that consider intentional, task-
unrelated thought to reflect mind-wandering. Thus, the field has operated not as if mind-wandering is 
heterogeneous, but rather, as if there are certain minimal values along one or more dimensions that are necessary to 
classically define the construct, and that, in the absence of such necessary and sufficient defining features, a thought 
does not qualify as mind-wandering. Put differently, there exist multiple, competing classical definitions of the 
construct, which can give rise to the illusion that mind-wandering is being treated as heterogeneous when in fact it 
has been treated as a singular, classically definable construct, with classical definitions that vary across studies.  
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attributes that overlap with the most other exemplars of the category, low-prototypical members 
have little overlap (see Figure 1, Key Figure, Panel a).  
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Figure 1 (Key Figure).  Schematic for a family-resemblances view.  
In panel (a) are four chairs that share one or more features with the each other. For example, the first, second, and 
fourth chairs all afford sitting (the third chair has a broken seat), and the first, second, and third chairs all have 
backs. However, no single feature runs through all members of the family of chairs. Hence, there is no universal 
IHDWXUHWKDWGHILQHVPHPEHUVKLS,QVWHDGWKH³IDPLO\´RIFKDLUVLVKHOGWRJHWKHUE\RYHUODSSLQJIHDWXUHV 
In panel (b) are examples of different definitions of mind-wandering from four articles [17, 20, 29, 54, respectively]. 
Across these articles, mind-wandering is defined with reference to specific aspects of conscious experiences, 
including intentionality, stimulus-dependence, task relatedness, and/or content stability. However, the family 
resemblances-view posits that, just as there is no single feature that defines the chair family, there are no specific 
features that a thought must have to be granted membership in the mind-wandering family. Instead, by the family-
resemblance view, mind-wandering is a collection of related experiences that share some, but not all, features.  
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Prototypicality and Graded Membership Within the Mind-Wandering Family 
A family-resemblances view characterizes mind-wandering as a natural category with 
graded membership (i.e., some exemplars are more prototypical than others; see Figure 1, Panel 
b). For instance, within the family of mind-wandering definitions presented in Figure 1, panel b, 
graded membership can be determined by identifying the number of shared features that each 
definition, or exemplar, shares with the others. The most frequently endorsed features of mind-
ZDQGHULQJDFURVVWKHVHGHILQLWLRQVLQFOXGH³XQLQWHQWLRQDO´DQG³WDVN-XQUHODWHG´WKRXJKWso 
thoughts characterized by these features would be considered more prototypical cases of mind-
wandering than thoughts characterized by less frequently shared features (e.g., intentional, or 
unguided thought). To empirically (and more systematically) quantify graded membership in the 
mind-wandering category, researchers could examine all definitions of mind-wandering reported 
in the literature and determine the extent to which features associated with each (e.g., task-
unrelatedness, intentionality, stimulus-dependence, and level of guidance) overlap with features 
associated with the other definitions.  
Alternatively (or additionally)DVLQ5RVFK¶VVHPLQDOUHVHDUFKRQJUDGHGPHPEHUVKLS
[34], researchers could ask people (experts, laypeople, or both) to report exemplars of mind-
wandering and assess which features of these exemplars overlap with others. Across different 
samples, however, there may, arise some variation in graded membership. For instance, the 
³PRVW prototypical´ case of mind-wandering identified by researchers may appear as a slightly 
less prototypical case in another sample, say, of novelists (although with sufficiently large 
datasets, increased stability should be achieved). In any case, such variation in prototypicality 
motivates rather than impedes a family-resemblances approach, since this conceptualization 
treats mind-wandering as a heterogeneous construct whose members share features with some 
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but not other members (in the same way, we can reasonably disagree about whether tennis or 
solitaire are more prototypLFDOJDPHVZLWKRXWWKUHDWHQLQJRXUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKH³JDPH´
category).  
The Mind-Wandering Family: Inclusion and Exclusion 
One unavoidable complication with natural categories is that their boundaries are not 
clearly demarcated. Indeed, absent a classical definition, there are no necessary and sufficient 
defining features with which to include or exclude exemplars from the category. For instance, 
whereas a four-legged object that affords sitting ZRXOGEHFODVVLILHGE\PRVWDVD³FKDLU´WKH 
point at which an object is granted or denied PHPEHUVKLSLQWKH³FKDLU´IDPLO\LVunclear. More 
SURWRW\SLFDO³FKDLUV´such as Adirondack and Windsor chairs elicit little dispute, but objects such 
as a tuffet, or even a large, flat rock, may generate disagreement. The rock shares at least one 
feature with prototypical chairs (it affords sitting), but few others. In the same way, for example, 
intentional, guided, stimulus-independent TUT might be considered analogous to the rock 
because it shares few features with common mind-wandering exemplars. And just as one cannot 
GHILQLWLYHO\VWDWH³WKHURFNLVLVQRWDFKDLU´RQHFDQQRWGHILQLWLYHO\FRQFOXGHZKHWKHU
intentional, guided, stimulus-independent TUT should be granted or denied membership in the 
mind-wandering family (for more on this topic, see Box 2). Nevertheless, this critical 
characteristic of natural constructs need not stifle investigations of mind-wandering. In fact, 
because the family-resemblances approach motivates more precise specification of the 
dimensions associated with the thoughts in question, we will be better able to investigate the 
causes, consequences, functions, and correlates of such thoughts. Moreover, by quantifying 
graded membership in the family, we can avoid erroneously equating all exemplars within the 
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family (i.e., we can identify exemplars that better capture the essence of mind-wandering via 
quantitative assessments of prototypicality).  
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Box 2. Characterizing graded membership in the mind-wandering family 
According to our argument, neither logic nor data can determine the types of thoughts 
that should be included or excluded from the mind-wandering family. This may seem 
problematic (if not perturbing), and thus present itself as a strike against the family-resemblances 
approach. This inability to definitively include or exclude thoughts from the mind-wandering 
family, however, is not a consequence of the family-resemblances approach, per se. Rather, it is 
a problem that necessarily arises with natural constructs that are not classically defined. A 
classical definition is required for determining not only which constructs ought to be included in 
a given family, but also those to be excluded. Thus, if one commits to an approach to mind-
wandering that avoids this inclusion-exclusion problem, one must also commit to a reasonable, 
tractable, classical definition of mind-wandering with unanimous agreement. As multiple 
definitions of mind-wandering already exist²some of which are mutually exclusive²this seems 
a fruitless endeavor: any disagreement would render the classical definition problematic, since it 
would exclude forms of thought that people recognize as mind-wandering. Thus, we suggest that 
the field cannot tenably reject the family-resemblances approach while also failing to generate an 
accepted classical definition.  
We reiterate that accepting mind-wandering as a fuzzy-boundaried and heterogenous 
construct does not bring its scientific study to a halt. Rather, it should prove theoretically fruitful 
because, by quantifying graded membership, we can determine more and less prototypical 
instances of mind-wandering and more accurately investigate their features and functions. As 
long as researchers are careful to report the specific (whether more or less prototypical) variety 
of mind-wandering they are investigating²an obligation derived from the family-resemblances 
approach²we can effectively isolate different types of mind-wandering, along with their causes, 
consequences, and associates, rather than conflating these unique experiences and 
inappropriately generalizing our results across all exemplars of mind-wandering. 
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Evidence Supporting the Utility of a Family-Resemblances View of Mind-Wandering 
Scientific benefits of adopting a family-resemblances view of mind-wandering are 
evident when different members of the mind-wandering family demonstrate distinct causes, 
consequences, or associates. Indeed, if different varieties of mind-wandering behave 
differently²and evidence suggests that they do²then ignoring their diversity may lead to 
underspecified or erroneous conclusions. Take, for instance, a study of mindfulness meditation¶V
effects on rates of stimulus-dependent and stimulus-independent TUT [35]. Participants first 
completed a sustained-attention task intermittently interrupted by ³WKRXJKWSUREHV´that asked 
whether any TUTs they experienced were stimulus-dependent or stimulus-independent (pretest). 
Participants then either engaged in mindfulness meditation or listened to an audiobook (control 
condition), after which they re-completed the sustained-attention task with thought probes (post-
test). Whereas rates of stimulus-independent TUT remained unchanged across pre- and post-tests 
for meditation subjects, they significantly increased for controls; in contrast, whereas rates of 
stimulus-dependent TUT did not vary from pre- to post-test in the meditation condition, they 
significantly decreased in the control condition (for similar dissociations of stimulus-dependent 
and stimulus-independent TUTs, see [36-38]). This dissociation reinforces the utility²if not 
necessity²of the family-resemblances approach to mind-wandering research: If these varieties 
of mind-wandering had been treated as reflecting a single, unitary construct, their unique 
behaviors would have been undetectable, and the potential effects of meditation might be 
misinterpreted.   
Another dissociation supporting a family-resemblances approach to mind-wandering 
comes from examining task-related versus task-unrelated mind-wandering during video lectures 
(here, task-related mind-wandering was operationalized as elaborations or reflections on lecture 
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material that did not correspond to the momentary video content [39]). Students who engaged in 
more task-related mind-wandering tended to recall more lecture-related details than did students 
who engaged in less, whereas students who reported higher rates of task-unrelated mind-
wandering tended to recall less information about the lecture than did those who reported lower 
rates. 
The utility of a family-resemblances view may be best illustrated by studies examining 
the correlates of mind-wandering experiences that are engaged with versus without intention. A 
large-scale neuroimaging study of trait variation in intentional and unintentional mind-wandering 
([40]; see Figure 2, panel a) found distinct neural correlates for these two thought types. Indeed, 
analysis of the whole-brain thickness of grey matter indicated mind-wandering-related 
differences in the retrosplenial cortex and the lingual gyrus: Whereas higher rates of 
unintentional mind-wandering were associated with greater thickness in the retrosplenial cortex 
and lingual gyrus in the left hemisphere, higher rates of intentional mind-wandering were 
associated with less cortical thickness in these same areas in the right hemisphere. A similar 
dissociative pattern emerges in behavioral data (see Figure 2, panel b): Whereas trait levels of 
intentional mind-wandering correlate positively with SHRSOH¶VWHQGHQF\toward non-reactivity to 
internal experiences (a facet of mindfulness), trait levels of unintentional mind-wandering 
correlate negatively with it [41]. Likewise, separate work [25] shows that, whereas people 
experience more intentional mind-wandering during easy versus difficult tasks, they report more 
unintentional mind-wandering in difficult versus easy tasks (for similar dissociations, see [42-
45]).  
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Figure 2. Distinct neurocognitive and behavioral correlates of unintentional and intentional mind-wandering.   
Panel (a) illustrates a dissociation between intentional and unintentional mind-wandering in correlations with 
thickness of the retrosplenial cortex/lingual gyrus [40]. Participants reporting higher rates of trait-level unintentional 
mind-wandering tended to show greater cortical thickness in the retrosplenial cortex/lingual gyrus in the left 
hemisphere than did participants reporting lower rates of unintentional mind-wandering. Conversely, participants 
reporting higher rates of trait-level intentional mind-wandering tended to show less cortical thickness in the 
retrosplenial cortex/lingual gyrus in the right hemisphere than did participants reporting lower rates of intentional 
mind-wandering.  
Panel (b) displays a dissociation between intentional and unintentional mind-wandering in their relations to self-
reported mindfulness (i.e., the non-reactivity to experience facet of the five-facet mindfulness questionnaire [55]). 
Whereas participants reporting higher rates of unintentional mind-wandering tended to report lower levels of 
mindfulness, those reporting higher rates of intentional mind-wandering tended to report higher levels of 
mindfulness. 
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These results, taken together, highlight the utility of a family-resemblances framework 
for mind-wandering research. The typical practice of treating mind-wandering as a unitary 
construct precludes important discoveries about the diversity of the mind-wandering family.  
Implications of a Family-Resemblances Approach to the Study of Mind-Wandering 
Acknowledging that mind-wandering is a heterogeneous concept and that a universally 
agreed-upon definition of mind-wandering²with necessary and sufficient conditions²is not 
forthcoming has implications for future scientific investigations. First, because family 
resemblances arise from common and distinct features, research may benefit from assessing 
multiple features of experience at the same time. This approach, which is common to daily-life 
investigations of mind-wandering [e.g., 46, 47, 48], but rare in laboratory studies (but see [26, 
49, 50]), asks participants to answer consecutive probe questions about immediate thought 
content, allowing researchers to identify common and distinct elements of experience. 
Multivariate statistical techniques can then reGXFHUHVSRQGHQWV¶GDWDLQWRDIHZGLPHQVLRQVWKDW
can be compared to other measures (such as neural function) to assess common versus distinct 
features or mechanisms. Limited but growing evidence suggests that stable features of 
experience across participant samples, and that, consistent with a family-resemblances account, 
these features differentially predict neurocognitive measures [50].  
Second, a family-resemblances approach encourages the field to consider which 
dimensions of experience should be studied in the first place. One approach to this problem is to 
have participants provide open-ended reports about their experiences. These could then be 
categorized (by participants or independent raters) based on established or novel dimensions of 
interest. Although open-ended reports can present interpretive challenges (such as requiring 
verbalization of potentially non-verbalizable experiences, reporting deeply personal thoughts, or 
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³SXQLVKLQJ´PLQG-wandering reports by making them more effortful than on-task reports), they 
have been successfully employed in some studies examining the temporal focus of mind-
wandering [51, 52]. Collecting large corpuses of open-ended reports would allow text-mining 
techniques to reveal novel and potentially unknown dimensions of the mind-wandering state. 
A family-resemblances approach might also increase the intellectual²if not 
methodological²connections among related phenomena that some might consider non-
prototypical mind-wandering, such as spontaneous autobiographical semantic memories, 
earworms, depressive rumination, and so forth. The heterogeneous view of mind-wandering 
facilitates the realization that neighboring constructs may be directly relevant to each other, and 
so they should not be studied in isolation, or reside in separate scientific literatures. 
Perhaps of most importance, a family-resemblances framework will encourage 
researchers to specify the mind-wandering feature(s) under study in their experiments, both to 
participants and readers. Methodological and conceptual clarity will simply require, in empirical 
PDQXVFULSWVVRPHWKLQJOLNHWKHIROORZLQJVHQWHQFH³+HUHZHFRQFHSWXDOL]HGPLQG-wandering 
as ________, and operationally defined it for our participants as ______BB´&ULWLFDOO\this 
approach allows researchers the freedom to study whatever features of mind-wandering they 
wish, while providing needed specificity about aspects of the experience being explored. 
Theorists will more easily compare results across studies, and researchers will carefully consider 
and motivate the specific type of mind-wandering they are studying, while ensuring that their 
conceptualizations of mind-wandering are not misaligned with their operational definitions, as in 
previous work [e.g., 1, 21, 53].  
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Concluding remarks 
Mind-wandering encompasses diverse subjective experiences that vary in their defining 
properties, and in some cases, in their causes, consequences, and correlates. As such, we think 
that mind-wandering is best considered and researched within a family-resemblances framework, 
which entails recognizing mind-wandering as a heterogeneous construct and clarifying the 
dimensions that are under investigation. The family-resemblances framework (a) eliminates 
unproductive GLVDJUHHPHQWDERXW³PLQG-ZDQGHULQJ´GHILQLWLRQVEembraces all commonly 
recognized forms of mind-wandering as worthy of study (e.g., deliberate daydreaming), (c) adds 
precision to operational definitions of mind-wandering, and (d) allows the field to retain the 
EURDGWHUP³PLQG-ZDQGHULQJ´ZKLFKKHOSIXOO\GHQRWHVWKHPLQG-wandering family and implies 
that distinct concepts within this family may be fundamentally similar to each other. Moreover, 
the family-resemblances perspective raises new questions regarding conceptual and 
methodological approaches to future research (See Outstanding Questions). By acknowledging 
the diversity of states and experiences that can be reasonably characterized as mind-wandering²
while simultaneously specifying the dimensions that are relevant to any particular 
investigation²psychologists and neuroscientists can begin to unravel the many strands that 
contribute to this ubiquitous yet elusive category of mental life. 
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Outstanding Questions Box 
x How are different dimensions of mind-wandering associated/dissociated with each other? 
Studies examining the overlap and differences among different varieties of mind-
wandering could provide important insights. For instance, unintentional TUT and task-
free rumination may have similar causes, in which case, methods of remediation for these 
two thought types may be similar. Moreover, whereas meandering, unguided thoughts 
may be particularly likely to lead to creative insights, perseverative, guided thoughts may 
not.  
 
x Do different external contexts (e.g., task difficulty, lab versus daily-life) or internal 
contexts (e.g., arousal, motivation) differentially evoke distinct varieties of mind-
wandering? Understanding the causes of different types of mind-wandering could be 
important in cases where people seek to reduce or increase the rate of occurrence of such 
thoughts. This could also inform theoretical accounts of mind-wandering. For instance, 
research has already suggested that manipulations of task difficulty can differentially 
affect rates of intentional and unintentional mind-wandering, and this has led some to 
propose separate mechanisms to explain the maintenance and occurrence of each thought 
type. 
 
x How many dimensions of mind-wandering can be reasonably measured during a single 
thought-probe? Although we have argued that it will be important for researchers to 
FRQFXUUHQWO\DVVHVVQXPHURXVIHDWXUHVRISDUWLFLSDQWV¶WKRXJKWVLWLVXQFOHDUKRZPDQ\
features of thought a participant can accurately report on. One concern is that 
participantV¶PHPRULHVIRUWKHIHDWXUHVRIWKHLUWKRXJKWVPD\EHVRPHZKDWWUDQVLHQWand 
so assessments of multiple features of thought may be problematic. Although research 
has suggested that participants are able to accurately report on various aspects of their 
thoughts, it will be important to closely examine this issue in future work, and to 
determine a limit for the number of dimensions that can be reasonably indexed. 
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